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Sosa v Alvarez-Machain and Human Rights Claims 
against Corporations under the Alien Tort Statute 
CARLOS MANUEL VAZQUEZ 
When the Supreme Court's decision in Sosa v Alvarez-Machain1 was handed 
down, some believed that the case sounded the death knell for the use of the 
Alien Tort Statute2 to maintain human rights claims against private corpora-
tions in the courts of the United States. 3 These claims seem to me to be over-
stated. The decision clarifies the nature of claims under the Alien Tort Statute to 
some extent, and places some limits on the theories available in actions against 
private corporations, but for the most part such suits remain as viable after Sosa 
as they were before. Unocal's recent decision to settle the claims against it for 
human rights violations in Burma4 is perhaps an implicit recognition that Sosa 
did not doom such claims. 
That is not to say, however, that victims of corporate human rights violations 
in developing countries should hold out much hope that their lot will be 
bettered through Alien Tort Statute litigation in the United States. Even before 
Sosa, such suits had a chance of producing results favourable to foreign plain-
tiffs only with respect to a very narrow category of human rights violations. 
Suits under the Alien Tort Statute were never. a very promising mechanism for 
addressing the problem of human rights violations caused by corporate 
conduct abroad. 
This paper first briefly describes the evolution of the Alien Tort Statute from 
the time it was reinvigorated in Filartiga v Peiia-lrala5 to the Supreme Court's 
decision in Sosa. It then discusses the implications of Sosa for human rights 
claims against private corporations and assesses the potential significance of 
federal human rights litigation as a mechanism for addressing the problems of 
those whose human rights are adversely affected by US corporations operating 
abroad. 
The Alien Tort Statute was enacted in 1789 as part of the United States' First 
Judiciary Act.6 It provides that the federal courts shall have jurisdiction over 
'any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of 
nations or a treaty of the United States' .7 There is little direct evidence of the 
I 124 s. Ct. 2739 (2004). 2 28 u.s.c. § 1350 (2000). 
3 R S Greenberger/P W Tam, Human Rights Suits Against U.S. Firms Curbed, Wall Street Journal 
( 30 June 2004) A3; W Richey, Ruling Makes it Harderfor Foreigners to Sue in US Courts, Christian 
Science Monitor (30 June 2004) 3. 
4 E Alden et a!, Unocal Pays Out in Burma Abuse Case, Financial Times ( 14 December 2004) 12 
(quoting the plaintiffs' lawyer as stating that the settlement was 'going to do some great things for 
the victims in Burma'). 5 630 F.2d 876, 2d Cir. (1980). 
6 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch 20, § 9(b), 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789) (codified as amended 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1350 (2000)). 7 28 u.s.c. § 1350. 
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sorts of actions the framers of the statute intended it to cover. Judge Friendly 
called it a 'legal Lohengrin' because 'no one seems to know whence it came'. 8 
For most of the country's history, the statute lay dormant. The US Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit breathed life into the statute in 1980 in the 
Filartiga case. The court there found that the statute conferred jurisdiction over 
a suit by the sister and father of a Paraguayan who had been tortured in 
Paraguay by the defendant, a low-level Paraguayan official who was then living 
in New York.9 The court held that jurisdiction existed because the plaintiffs 
were aliens and they were suing for a tort committed in violation of interna-
tional law. The bulk of the opinion addressed whether torture violated interna-
tionallaw, and the court concluded that it did. It wrote that 'for purposes of 
civil liability, the torturer has become-like the pirate and slave trader before 
him-hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind' .10 
Filartiga exemplifies the least controversial category of contemporary human 
rights lawsuit under the Alien Tort Statute. The defendant was the person who 
had personally perpetrated the acts complained of, and those acts violated 
clearly established norms of international human rights law. Subsequent 
litigants pushed the envelope in several directions. Suits were brought against 
persons who authorized or failed to prevent violations of human rights norms, 
but did not personally commit them.11 Others were brought against entities 
that were not recognized states, 12 or officials of such entities.13 Suits were 
brought alleging violations of less-established principles of internationallaw.14 
Some of these suits survived motions to dismiss; others did not. 
As long as only foreign officials were being sued, human rights litigation 
under the Alien Tort Statute did not excite significant opposition, except within 
a segment of legal academia.15 In fact, Congress codified this line of cases, and 
extended the right of action to citizens, when it enacted the Torture Victim 
Protection Act.16 The lack of opposition may have had something to do with the 
fact that the defendants typically left the country or were expelled after being 
served with the complaint, 17 and as a consequence the suits that were not 
dismissed at the threshold usually wound up producing default judgments that, 
with few exceptions, were never collected. Thus, although these lawsuits 
8 ITTv Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015, 2d Cir. (19751. 
9 Filartiga v Pena-lrala, 630 F.2d at 887. 10 ibid. 
11 SeeHilao v Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 789, 9th Cir. (1996);Xuncax v Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 
162, 171-75, D. Mass. (1995). 
12 Tel-Oren v Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, D.C. Cir. (1984). 
13 KadicvKaradzic, 70 F.3d 232,2d Cir. (1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1005 (1996). 
14 Flores v Southern Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140, 2d Cir. (2003) (environmental harm)· Tel-
Oren, 726 F.2d 774 (terrorism). ' 
15 See C A Bradley/] L Goldsmith, ill, The Current Tilegitimacy of International Human Rights 
Litigation, 66 Fordham Law Review 319, 358-359 (1997); J M Simon, The Alien Tort Claims Act: 
Justice or Show Trials?, 11 Boston University International Law Journal 1 ( 1993 ). 
16 Codified in a note to 28 U.S.C. § 1350. 
17 eg Paul v Avril, 901 F. Supp. 330, S.D. Fla. (1994); Todd v Panjaitan, No 92-12255, 1994 WL 
827111, D. Mass. (26 October 1994). 
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showed the United States' abhorrence of the conduct of the defendants, and 
also gave victims a forum for the ventilation of their claims and deterred foreign 
torturers from travelling to the United States, they did not generally provide 
compensation to the victims. The lawsuits served a largely expressive function, 
and the costs were borne largely by foreign plaintiffs (and the human rights 
organizations representing them) and, where the defendant did not default, by 
foreign individuals guilty of gruesome acts. 
Litigation under the Alien Tort Statute began attracting significant attention 
outside the human rights community when the lawsuits began targeting US 
corporations that were alleged to have aided and abetted foreign states in 
violating international law, or to have committed violations of international 
law directly themselves. The best known of these cases is Doe v Unoca/. 18 The 
plaintiffs were Burmese villagers who alleged that the US corporation Unocal 
had made use of forced labour in connection with its Yamada Pipeline project 
in Burma. A panel of the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit allowed the 
case to proceed on two alternative theories. First, it held that the international 
law norm prohibiting forced labour was 'among the "handful of crimes ... to 
which the law of nations attributes individual liability," such that state action 
is not required' .19 Secondly, it held that Unocal could be held liable for aiding 
and abetting the Burmese government's violations of the plaintiffs' human 
rights if Unocal's conduct violated international law norms prohibiting aiding 
and abetting.20 Judge Reinhardt concurred, but differed with the majority 
regarding the law that determined Unocal's liability for aiding and abetting. In 
the view of Judge Reinhardt, plaintiffs did not have to establish that Unocal's 
conduct violated international law. If the Burmese government's conduct 
violated international law, 'the ancillary legal question of Unocal's third-party 
tort liability should be resolved by applying general federal common law tort 
principles, such as agency, joint venture, or reckless disregard' .21 
This and other lawsuits against US corporations22 produced a backlash 
against the Alien Tort Statute. Books about the Alien Tort Statute began 
appearing with titles such as Awakening Monster.23 The executive branch, 
which had sided with the plaintiffs in prior ATS cases,24 began arguing that 
Filartiga had been wrongly decided. The United States filed an amicus brief 
supporting en bane review in Unocal, arguing that the Alien Tort Statute is 
18 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263. 
19 ibid (quoting Tel-Oren v Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 794-95, D.C. Cir. (1984)) U 
Edwards, concurring). 20 ibid. 
21 ibid U Reinhardt, concutring). 
22 eg Wiwa v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 2d Cir. (2000); Villeda Aldana v Fresh 
Del Monte Produce, Inc., 305 F. Supp. 2d 1285, S.D. Fla. (2003); Estate of Rodriguez v Drummond 
Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1250, N.D. Ala. (2003 ); Presbyterian Church of Suda v Talisman Energy, Inc., 
244 F. Supp. 2d 289, S.D.N.Y. (2003); Abdullahi v Pfizer, Inc. (2002) U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17436, 
S.D.N.Y. (2002); Sarei v Rio Tinto Ltd., 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, C.D. Cal. (2002). 
23 G C Hufbauer/N K Mitrokostas, Awakening Monster: The Alien Tort Statute of 1789 (2003). 
24 See Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Cutiae, Filartiga v Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 
2d Cir. (1980). 
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purely a jurisdictional statute, that it does not create a right of action, and that 
a right of action for claims relying on customary international law may be 
maintained only if other statutes-such as the Torture Victim Protection Act-
create a right of action. 25 (The Court of Appeals granted the petition for rehear-
ing en bane and vacated the panel's decision. 26) The United States took a 
similarly broad position in its amicus brief in Sosa v Alvarez-Machain, even 
though narrower arguments would have sufficed to deny relief in that case.27 
Had the Court agreed, Fildrtiga itself would have been effectively overruled and 
the Alien Tort Statute would have returned to its somnolent pre-Fildrtiga state. 
The Supreme Court in Sosa rejected the United States' interpretation. Rather 
than reverse Fildrtiga, it cited it with approval and left the door ajar for the use 
of the Alien Tort Statute to challenge human rights abuses.28 But the Court 
enjoined the courts to be 'vigilant doorkeep[ers)'.29 The Court held that the 
Alien Tort Statute was purely jurisdictional, meaning that the right of action 
must have its source elsewhere. However, rather than requiring a federal statu-
tory source for the right of action, such as the Torture Victim Protection Act, the 
Court recognized a power in the federal courts to enforce a 'limited category' of 
norms of customary international law as a matter of federal common law. 30 It 
recognized that, at the time the Alien Tort Statute was enacted, customary 
international law was regarded as part of the common law and enforceable as 
such in the courts without prior transformation into domestic law by statute. 
The Court concluded that the framers of the statute meant to authorize the 
adjudication in federal court of a 'narrow set of violations of the law of nations, 
admitting of a judicial remedy and at the same time threatening serious con-
sequences in international affairs'. 31 'Uppermost in the legislative mind appears 
to have been offences against ambassadors; violations of safe conduct were 
probably understood to be actionable, and individual actions arising out of prize 
captures and piracy may well have also been contemplated.'32 After considering 
a number of reasons counselling caution in adapting the expectations of the 
statute's framers to today's world, in which the common law is understood very 
differently from in the past and customary international law has a very different 
content, the Court held that the courts 'should not recognize private claims 
under federal common law for violations of any international law norm with 
less definite content and acceptance among civilized nations than the historical 
paradigms familiar when [the Alien Tort Statute] was enacted'. 33 
Although the Court did not say that the courts should always recognize 
private claims for violations of international law norms with content that is as 
25 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Doe v Unocal Corp., 9th Cir. (2002) (Nos 
00-56603, 00-56628). 
26 Doe v Unocal (2003) U.S. App. LEXIS 2716, 9th Cir. (14 February 2003). 
27 See Reply Brief for the United States as respondent Supporting Petitioner, Sosa v Alvarez-
Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004) (No 03-339); Brief of the United States as Respondent Supporting 
Petitioner, Sosa v Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004) (No 03-339). 
28 Sosa, 124 S. Ct. 2764. 2~ ibid. 30 ibid 2754. 31 ibid 2756. 
32 ibid 2759. 33 ibid 2766. 
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definite as the historical paradigms, I think it is fair to read the opinion as 
contemplating that such claims should ordinarily be recognized, subject to 
possible limiting doctrines of a procedural nature, such as exhaustion of 
remedies, or case-specific deference to foreign policy concerns of the executive 
branch. In a footnote, the Court stated that the 'requirement of clear definition 
is not meant to be the only principle limiting the availability of relief in the 
federal courts for violations of customary international law', and listed exhaus-
tion of remedies and deference to the executive as possible additional limita-
tions. 34 The Court did not limit the possible limitations to those two, nor did it 
adopt those two limitations. The two are therefore merely illustrations of the 
sort of limitations the Court has in mind. Significantly, neither relates to the 
nature of the international law obligation that was violated. 
That international law norms that protect individuals and are of definite 
content and wide acceptance will generally be enforceable through federal 
common law actions under Sosa is strongly suggested by the Court's statement 
that the approach it was adopting 'is generally consistent with the reasoning of 
many of the courts and judges who faced the issue before it reached this 
Court'.35 The Court cited Fildrtiga with approval for the proposition that 'the 
torturer has become-like the pirate and slave trader before him-hostis 
humani generis, an enemy of all mankind'. 36 It also cited Judge Edwards' state-
ment in Tel-Oren that the 'limits of section 1350's reach' should be defined by 
'a handful of heinous actions-each of which violates definable, universal and 
obligatory norms',37 and the holding of In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights 
Litigation that '[a]ctionable violations of international law must be of a norm 
that is specific, universal, and obligatory'.38 The opinion thus appears to 
approve of the Fildrtiga line of cases as it had been applied by most lower courts 
until that point. 
One of the open questions after the Sosa decision concerns the extent to 
which the Alien Tort Statute remains available as a source of jurisdiction over 
suits against private corporations. Some commentators have read the Court's 
opinion as sounding the death knell to such suits, 39 while others believe that 
Sosa blesses them. 40 In my view, Sosa does neither. The Court referred to 
suits against corporations only in a footnote, in which it said that '[a] related 
consideration [related, apparently, to whether the international-law norm is 
sufficiently well-established] is whether international law extends the scope of 
liability for a violation of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the 
defendant is a private actor such as a corporation or individual' .41 The footnote 
does not rule out the possibility that private corporations might be subject to 
34 ibid 2766 fn 21. 35 ibid 2765-66. 
36 ibid 2766 (quoting Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 890). 37 Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 781. 
38 In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1475, 9th Cir. (1994). 39 Seen 3. 
40 SeeR Gertner, Human Rights Claims Against Corporations May Go Forward, Law Wkly. USA 
(19 July 2004) at 1 (quoting W Aceves, a professor who submitted an amicus brief in support of 
Alvarez, stating that the court 'has givea a green light to litigation under the Alien Tort Statute'). 
41 Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2766 fn 20. 
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federal common law rights of action for violations of customary international 
law. Indeed, one of the two cases the Court cited in this footnote, without 
disapproval, held that a suit could be maintained under the Alien Tort Statute 
against a 'private actor' alleged to have committed genocide.42 That Unocal 
does not believe that Sosa precludes Alien Tort Statute suits against private 
corporations is suggested by its recent decision to settle the Unocal case for an 
undisclosed sum that reportedly 'thrilled' the plaintiffs' lawyers.43 
Sosa also sheds some light on the issue that divided the panel in Unocal. The 
majority held that, if the plaintiff did not rely on a norm of international law 
directly applicable to private parties, an ATS action could succeed against a 
private party only if principles of international law imposed liability on the 
private party for aiding and abetting the state's violation of international law. 
Judge Reinhardt maintained that, if the plaintiff could establish a violation of 
an international legal norm by the state, the private party could be found liable 
for aiding and abetting under federal common law. The Supreme Court's 
analysis in Sosa seems closer to Judge Reinhardt's than to that of the Unocal 
majority, although that analysis may well lead to the conclusion reached by the 
majority. 
For the Sosa majority, the liability of a defendant in an ATS case results from 
a combination of international law and federal common law. The opinion 
strongly suggests that the courts are to look to international law to determine 
whether a primary rule of international law has been violated. If such a viola-
tion has occurred, the existence of a secondary rule entitling the plaintiff to 
relief is a matter of judge-made federal common law.44 Consistent with this 
interpretation the Court speaks of the judicial 'creation of a federal remedy'45 
or 'the creation by judges of a private cause of action to enforce ... the rule [of 
customary international law]'. 46 Similarly, in rejecting Alvarez's arbitrary 
detention claim, the Court notes that he invoked a 'broad principle' that reflects 
an 'aspiration' rather than an established rule of law, and it concluded that 
'[c]reating a private cause of action to further that aspiration would go beyond 
any residual common law discretion we think it appropriate to exercise'.47 The 
implication is that it is appropriate for the courts to create a remedy for injuries 
caused by conduct that violates well-defined and well-established norms of 
international law. If so, the Unocal majority was too demanding in insisting 
that the plaintiff must establish that international law imposes individual 
42 See Kadic v Karadzic, 70 F. 3d 232,239-241, 2d Cir. (1995), cited in Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2766 
(describing Kadic as holding that there was a 'sufficient consensus in 1995 that genocide by private 
actors violates international law'). 
43 See L Girion, Unocal To Settle Rights Claims, L.A. Times ( 14 December 2004). 
44 In international legal discourse, 'secondary rules' are those that specify the legal consequences 
of a breach of the primary rules. On the distinction between the primary and secondary rules of 
international law, see Commentaries to the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No 10, Comment 1, U.N. Doc 
N56110 (2001). 45 Sosa, 2767 (emphasis supplied). 
46 ibid 2769 fn 29 (emphasis supplied). 47 ibid 2767 (fns omitted; emphasis supplied). 
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liability for the acts committed by the defendant. The defendant's liability is a 
matter of secondary or remedial law. As Judge Reinhardt wrote, 'international 
law applies to determine whether a violation has occurred'.48 If there has been 
a violation of international law, it is for the Court to create a remedy in appro-
priate circumstances. 
It is true that the Court in Sosa indicated that the question 'whether interna-
tionallaw extends the scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to the 
perpetrator being sued' would be a 'consideration' 'if the defendant [were] a 
private actor such as a corporation or individual' .49 Although its use of the term 
'liability' here does suggest that international law determines the remedy as well 
as the violation, I doubt that that is what the Court meant. The cases it cited 
to illustrate the point both involved, in the Court's own description, whether 
primary norms of international law were 'violate[d]'.50 Moreover, the Court's 
statement that this is a 'consideration' may just mean that it is sufficient but not 
necessary that international law impose individual liability. Thus, despite this 
footnote, the thrust of the Court's analysis is consistent with Judge Reinhardt's 
conclusion that, in ATS cases, the rules governing primary conduct come from 
international law, while the secondary, or remedial, rules are a matter of federal 
common law. 
On the other hand, the Supreme Court might well reject Judge Reinhardt's 
specific conclusion that the 'aiding and abetting' standards that apply in ATS 
cases come from federal common law rather than international law. If the Court 
in Sosa held that international law supplies the primary rules while federal 
common law supplies the secondary rules, it may follow that the plaintiff must 
establish that the defendant's conduct violated international law. Aiding and 
abetting standards may relate to primary rules of international law, if one 
defines primary rules as those that determine whether the defendant committed 
a violation of the law in the first place. Thus, if the norm that was allegedly vio-
lated is one that only applies to state action, the plaintiff may have to show that 
the private defendant 'aided and abetted' the violation under international law 
standards. Under this approach, private parties could be subjected to liability in 
ATS cases if they violated international law norms that apply to private parties, 
or if they aided and abetted a state's violation under international law standards. 
It is of course possible that later cases may rule out the judicial creation of 
rights of action against private parties altogether. The Court, after all, urged 
caution and gave a non-exhaustive list of illustrations of possible additional 
limitations. But the Court gave no affirmative support to a rule barring the 
recognition of a private right of action against private corporations that violate 
norms of international law that are sufficiently defined and established. Thus, 
the Alien Tort Statute remains available as a basis for human rights suits against 
private corporations, although, in the light of Sosa's holding that the ATS is 
48 Unocal U Reinhardt, concurring). 
50 Ibid. 
49 Sosa at 2766 fn. 20 (emphasis supplied). 
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purely jurisdictional, such suits should probably be called 'federal common 
law' actions rather than Alien Tort Statute actions. 51 
Even though human rights claims against private corporations remain 
available after Sosa, it cannot be said that the Alien Tort Statute offers much 
hope for redress for people from developing countries whose human rights have 
been adversely affected by private corporations. First, most international law 
norms regarding human rights do not apply directly to private businesses. The 
Unocal case implicated one of only a 'handful' of norms that has a plausible 
claim to being applicable to private entities-the norm prohibiting forced 
labour, which the panel in Unocal viewed as the contemporary version of the 
norm prohibiting slavery. With respect to other norms, corporations could be 
held liable in ATS lawsuits, at best, only through an aiding and abetting theory. 
The question whether the international law standards for aiding and abetting 
must meet the Sosa standard of being well-established and well-defined and, if 
so, whether they do meet that standard, was before the Court of Appeals in 
Unocal at the time the settlement agreement was reached. The United States 
submitted an amicus brief arguing that the standard does apply and was not 
met. 52 Regardless of how that issue is ultimately decided, the prospect of 
maintaining lawsuits against private corporations for human rights violations 
under an aiding and abetting theory would remain quite narrow. Liability as an 
aider and abettor would appear to be available at best only when the state is the 
principal culprit and the corporation the enabler. That will be the case, I sus-
pect, only in a very small proportion of the situations in which human rights are 
threatened by private corporations. 
Not everyone agrees that only a handful of international human rights norms 
impose obligations directly on private actors, such as corporations. A different 
view is reflected in a document titled 'Norms on the Responsibilities of 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to 
Human Rights', which was adopted in August 2003 by the Sub-commission on 
the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights of the UN Commission on 
Human Rights, 53 but was tabled by the Commission in August 2004 for further 
discussion. 54 This document sets forth a lengthy list of obligations of private 
51 Even though the Court took pains to clarify that it regarded the Alien Tort Statute as purely 
jurisdictional, and the private right of action as federal common law, it is not clear to me that there 
is much practical difference between its holding and a holding that the private right of action has its 
basis in the Alien Tort Statute. The right of action clearly does have its basis in the Alien Tort Statute 
in the sense that the Court relied on the expectations of the framers of that statute to approve the 
judicial recognition of private rights of action to enforce norms of customary international law as a 
matter of federal common law. 
52 Supplemental Brief for the United States of America as Amicus Curiae in Doe v Unocal Corp., 
Nos 00-5 6603, 00-5 6628 (dated August 2004). 
53 UN Doc EJCN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (2003) [hereinafter 'Norms']. 
54 See A Blyth, Compromise deal reached on UN Norms, Ethical Corporation (21 April2004) 
available at http://www.ethicalcorp.com/content.asp?ContentiD=1947; B Hearne, Proposed UN 
Norms on human rights shelved in favor of more study, Ethical Corporation (3 May 2004) available 
at http://www.ethicalcorp.com/content.asp?ContentiD= 1981. 
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corporations under international law. The document does not make it entirely 
clear whether it was meant to reflect existing international law or instead to 
furnish a basis for the development of international law. In my view, it does a bit 
of both. A few of the obligations set forth in the document do apply directly 
to private actors. These include the prohibition of forced labour, already 
discussed, and the prohibition of genocide. 55 But most of the obligations set 
forth in the document apply to private actors, at best, indirectly.56 This is the 
case, for example, with respect to the anti-corruption provisions, 57 which are 
based on conventions that require states to enact laws prohibiting certain 
acts by private actors. 58 Similarly, the antidiscrimination norms59 appear to be 
indirectly applicable to private actors, insofar as they are based on the UN 
conventions addressing race and gender discrimination. 60 
Other human rights norms to which the Norms purports to hold privq.,t~ 
corporations seem difficult to apply to the conduct of private entities at all. 
For example, the Norms provide that '[t]ransnational corporations and other 
business enterprises shall respect economic, social and cultural rights as well as 
civil and political rights and contribute to their realization, in particular the 
rights to development, adequate food and drinking water, the highest attainable 
standard of physical and mental health, adequate housing, privacy, education, 
freedom of thought, conscience, and religion and freedom of opinion and 
expression'.61 The content of the obligation to 'contribute to [the] realization' 
of economic and social rights is difficult to ascertain, given that, under the 
Convention on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, these rights are subject 
to progressive realization, meaning that the parties to the convention are 
required to 'take steps to the maximum extent of their available resources, with 
a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in 
the Covenant'. 62 The obligation to realize these rights progressively necessarily 
recognizes that there are a number of conflicting demands on a state's resources. 
Is it envisioned that a private corporation would have similar discretion to 
balance the competing demands on its resources? Is the demand to make a 
profit to survive in the unforgiving global marketplace to be taken into account 
in determining how much of the corporation's resources are available? Do the 
Norms reflect the belief that international law draws a line between appropri-
ate and excessive profits? In short, translating an obligation of states to an 
55 Norms (n 53) Art 3. 
56 See Generally Carlos M Vazquez, Direct vs. Indirect Obligations of Corporations Under 
International Law, 43 Colum. J. Transnational Law 927 (2005). 57 Norms (n 53) Art 11. 
58 See Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions (17December 1997) Arts 1, 2, 4, 37I.L.M.l. 5~ Norms (n 53) Art2. 
6° Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Art 2(1)(d) (28 
September 1966) 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 51.L.M. 352; Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination 
Against Women, Art (2)(e), G.A. Res. 34/180, UN GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No 46 at 193, UN Doc 
A/RES/341180 (1979) (erttered into force 3 September 1981). 61 Norms (n 53) Art 12. 
62 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, UN 
GAOR,21stSess, Supp. No 16 at49, UNDocN6316 (1966). 
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obligation of private enterprises poses especially severe challenges in the case of 
economic and social rights. 
Yet it is economic and social rights that preoccupy those who advocate 
expanding the obligations of private corporations under international law. 
Such arguments tend to emphasize the economic power of corporations 
in today's world, which dwarfs that of many sovereign countries and enables 
the corporations to force economic concessions from developing countries. 
Because such countries cannot protect their citizens against such powerful 
economic forces, it is argued, the international community must step in. 63 If the 
case for direct international regulation of private corporations by international 
law is based on this economic imbalance of powers, it seems to reflect primar-
ily a concern about the protection of economic and social rights, broadly under-
stood. Yet it is these rights that are least likely to be enforceable in US courts 
through the Alien Tort Statute. Not only is the application of these norms to 
private corporations most problematic in this context, even the obligations of 
states in this area are rather ill-defined. 
Nor is there much ground for optimism that the ATS will be expanded to 
make such rights judicially enforceable by aliens against US corporations. The 
interests that would be burdened by such an extension of the ATS are politically 
and economically powerful business entities in the United States. Those pri-
marily benefited are relatively powerless individuals in foreign countries, who 
lack a voice in the American political process. Indeed, the United States is not 
even a party to the Covenant on Economic and Social Rights. The possibility 
that any developed country will significantly burden its own businesses for the 
benefit of the downtrodden in other countries seems remote. 
It also seems unlikely that the international community will address this 
problem in the manner seemingly contemplated by the Norms-that is, 
through the articulation and enforcement of international law obligations 
directly on private corporations. Most who argue for extending international 
law to private corporations appear to view international articulation and 
enforcement of such norms as a supplement to national regulation rather than 
a threat to state sovereignty. 64 This overlooks the fact that direct international 
regulation of private entities would represent a significant loss of power for 
states, which otherwise would retain control of compliance with international 
law. Such a move would make international law more effective, but it would do 
so by circumventing states. It is for this reason that the international law obli-
gations that are recognized to apply directly to private parties do not exceed a 
handful. Attempts to expand the number are likely to face significant resistance. 
63 eg S R Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111 Yale 
Law Journal (2001) 443,461-62. 
64 This seems true of the UN Norms themselves, which, while articulating the obligations of 
corporations directly under international law and calling for international enforcement mechan-
isms, see UN Norms (n 53) Art 16, affirm that states have the primary duty to protect human rights. 
See ibid Arts 1,17, 19. 
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If so, then any international regulation of corporations is likely to be indirect. 
In other words, it is likely to take the form of treaties imposing on states the 
obligation to regulate corporations in certain ways. Many such treaties already 
exist, but they typically contemplate that states will regulate the conduct of 
corporations in their own territory, not extraterritorially. 65 A state could 
conceivably decide to enforce these norms extraterritorially, subject to norms 
of international law that might limit its ability to do so, such as those regarding 
free trade. But, for reasons already discussed, there may not be much basis 
for optimism that they will do so to any significant extent. It may be more 
promising for those of us concerned with the lot of the poor in developing 
countries to focus more of our efforts on building the will and capacity of the 
governments of developing countries to protect the interests of their citizens 
through national or multinational regulation of private corporations doing 
business in their territories. 
65 See, eg, conventions cited above (n 60). 
